18 June 2025
Coauthors: Brett Mitchell, Tracey Bucknall, Allen Cheng, Phil Russo, Andrew Stewardson
In Australia, HAIs are not notifiable => We have no robust way to track whether their prevalence is increasing or decreasing
HAIs are actively monitored across Europe through the ECDC
The data were obtained in a point prevalence survey on an enormous scale
A point prevalence survey counts the number of people with a condition on a given day
For the Australian PPS:
The hospitals sampled make up approximately 60% of all overnight separations in Australia
Hospital prevalence, P, estimated as
P = r \times Beta(n_{\text{obs}}, N-n_{\text{obs}}+1) + (1-r) \times Beta(n_{\text{obs}}+1, N-n_{\text{obs}})
Hospital incidence, I, calculated as
I = P \frac{\text{LA}}{\text{LOI}}
where
\text{LA} is taken from the AIHW 2018 statistics on all public hospitals.
No data on length of infection, only LOI_\text{pps}, the length of stay until the date of survey.
We can calculate
P(LOI_\text{pps} = 1),
the probability a patient is in the first day of their HAI. Then, approximate LOI with
E[LOI] = 1 / P(LOI_\text{pps} = 1).
For small sample sizes, results has shown this is biased, so we use a mixture of this estimator and the empirical mean.
Calculate population incidence as
I_{\text{pop}} = I \times N_{\text{discharges}}.
For us, N_{\text{discharges}} = 3,713.513, which is 60% of the total admissions in the year.
This is one of the few pieces of data Australia has that the ECDC doesn’t!
Use a multinomial likelihood with a Dirichlet prior, with weights taken from the number of cases in each age/sex category.
A psuedocount is added to each strata (0.001\sum \text{weights}) to ensure likelihood can be calculated with empty strata
This psuedocount almost surely induces bias, and there are better techniques out there.
Use the McCabe score, which gives the life expectancy according to severity of disease. Patients are categorised as:
These scores, combined with disease outcome trees, give DALYs and deaths.
Number of HAIs (95% CI) |
Deaths (95% CI) |
DALYs (95% CI) |
|
---|---|---|---|
SSI | 44,238 (31,176 - 73,797) |
876 (617 - 1,263) |
13,197 (9,298 - 19,001) |
UTI | 42,408 (25,200 - 68,735) |
729 (259 - 1,772) |
16,087 (5,939 - 37,218) |
CDI | 5,125 (2,360 - 10,740) |
262 (13 - 836) |
2,757 (241 - 8,655) |
HAP | 51,499 (31,343 - 82,877) |
1,904 (462 - 4,430) |
39,276 (17,608 - 77,915) |
BSI | 23,979 (15,658 - 36,245) |
3,512 (1,874 - 6,075) |
46,773 (26,205 - 79,104) |
All | 170,574 (135,779 - 213,898) |
7,583 (4,941 - 11,135) |
122,376 (85,136 - 172,784) |
That’s 1 in 20 admissions resulting in an avoidable infection!
First estimate of HAI burden in Australia using (relatively) robust survey data in an established framework
Based on first point prevalence survey since 1984
There is no routine surveillance of HAIs in Australia
Point prevalence surveys remain the only way to understand the burden of these conditions
This work has informed guidance on HAI surveillance in Australia, including new funding schemes to better understand these conditions.
And all this based on just 2767 patients from 19 hospitals…
They represent great opportunity for improvement, and we have a long way to go to prevent them entirely.
D. Wu; T. Donker; B. Cooper; M. Easton; N. Geard; C. Gorrie; D. Hennessy; B. Howden; A. Peleg; A. Turner; A. Wilson; A. Stewardson on behalf of the ECHIDNA study group
Notifications are required to be sent to the Department of Health within 24 hours of a positive result.
However, this is a one-way system. Hospitals can not look up a patient to see if they have tested positive previously at a different health service.
The immediate question:
When an outbreak is detected, what other hospitals could be affected?
Natural to consider patients in a hospital as a network, that has the nodes as the hospitals and edges between them related to the probability of transfer.
Current methods can grossly over-estimate the rate of spread of disease between hospitals
Most methods are based on line-listed admissions data:
patient_id | admission_date | separation_date | location | diagnosis_codes |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2020-01-01 | 2020-01-02 | H1 | A B C |
2 | 2020-01-01 | 2020-01-02 | H2 | A B C |
1 | 2020-01-03 | 2020-01-04 | H2 | A B C |
This is interpreted as one transfer from H1 to H2, with a one-day gap.
Our dataset is also linked to notifiable diseases, genomic information and some ward-level information.
Some notation:
Then, we have the following set of governing equations:
d_{uv}(s,t) = \frac{\sum_{s,t} w_{uv}(s,t)}{T_\Sigma N_u}
Tip
All movements are instanteous, and the rate of movement is the mean over the entire observation period.
Choose a threshold value, \omega, to separate direct and indirect transfers
d_{uv}(s,t) = d_{uv} = \frac{\sum_{s,t: (t-s) < \omega} w_{uv}(s,t)}{T_\Sigma N_u} \eta_{uv}(s,t) = \eta_{uv} = \frac{\sum_{s,t: (t-s) \geq \omega} w_{uv}(s,t)}{T_\Sigma N_u} \rho_{uv}(s,t) = \rho_{uv} = \left[ \frac{\sum_{s,t: (t-s) \geq \omega} (t-s) w_{uv}(s,t)}{\sum_{s,t: (t-s) \geq \omega} w_{uv}(s,t)} \right]^{-1}
Choose a snapshot duration \omega. This defines the threshold duration of an indirect transfer.
\begin{aligned} \lambda(u(s) \to {z'}_{uv}(t)) &= \eta_{uv}(s, t)\\ \lambda({z'}_{uv}(t) \to z_{uv}(t)) &= \delta(t \; \mathrm{ mod } \; \omega)\\ \end{aligned}
z' contains the individuals that would enter z within the duration of a given snapshot [t, t+\omega], so that they do not immediately readmit to their next hospital.
Effecitvely, choose a very small snapshot window, \omega. Individuals are not re-admitted to z', instead they are re-admitted to v uniformly between t and t+\omega. This gives,
d_{uv}(s, t) = \frac{\sum_{t: (t-s) < \omega} w_{uv}(s, t)}{\omega N_u} \eta_{uv}(s, t) = \frac{\sum_{t: (t-s) \geq \omega} w_{uv}(s, t)}{\omega N_u} \rho_{uv}(s,t) = \frac{1}{\lceil t \rceil_\omega - t}
Current state-of-the-art: Patients move instantly, no concept of home, using average return rates over the entire data period
Our models: from least to most ‘accurate’
Time is critical when considering an outbreak
The immediate question:
When an outbreak is detected, what other hospitals could be affected?
Changes over time, but it’s not as fast as you think it is
conmat
…and more.
If your work is broadly related to infectious diseases, or biosciences, I would love to talk more.
Patients colonised with CPE have historically required isolation on every hospital admission post-diagnosis.
This means:
independent of colonisation or future testing status.
These rules have put a large strain on single-patient rooms, and has negative patient experiences in hospital.
Recently, this has been changed where individuals can be released from contact precautions if they have not tested positive for CPE in the last 12 months
We wanted to determine how many extra beds may be available under the new guidelines.
We assume contact precautions start on the ‘onset date’ of CPE for a patient.
Does free up beds (roughly 16 in 2019), but within 12 months this gain has been eroded.